the Katrina affair, an event repeatedly drummed into the American psyche by non-stop newscasts in late August and early September 2005.
There is, however, a high irony in the Katrina failure. Central to the criticism of the Bush Administration was its multi-day indecisiveness after the Hurricane made landfall about whether to deploy the overwhelming military assets of the Federal government to rescue and protect Gulf Coast citizens overwhelmed by one of the country's worst natural disasters. 5 As will be shown in greater detail below, 6 the President failed to act decisively at that time because of a perceived lack of Constitutional authority to override Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco's refusal to allow the Federal government to have ultimate control over the deployment of those troops and related Federal assets.
Karl Rove, the then White House Deputy Chief of Staff, is reported to have said, "[t]he only mistake we made with Katrina was not overriding the local government." 7 Yet, it is noteworthy that this Constitutional uncertainty emanated from the very same Administration which has, as its most prominent hallmark, made breathtaking claims of broad inherent Presidential authority to act unilaterally in the War on Terror. 8 Indeed, in a telling criticism of the lack of support from the Federal government, including the military, Michael Brown, testifying before a Senate committee, noted that if it had been "confirmed that a terrorist ha [d] blown up the 17th Street Canal levee, then everybody 5 See, e.g., TOWNSEND, supra note 3, at 54; see also would have jumped all over that and been trying to do everything they could." 9 However, because the event was a natural phenomenon, the Bush Administration's first instinct was to follow the usual template for response to natural disasters, i.e., to rely on the States and cities involved to take the lead, and, in the event of inadequacies at those levels of governments, to take over the governmental response only if invited to do so. 14 Note, throughout this article, the term "Federal troops" refers to both the armed forces and the federalized National Guard.
Indeed, the indecision surrounding the use of Federal troops was doubtless aggravated by the paralyzing effect of a single Reconstruction era Federal statute: the Posse Comitatus Act ("PCA"). That statute provides that "except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress," Federal troops may not be used for domestic law enforcement. 15 As is shown below, the Bush Administration by the end of 2004 had already worked out and publicly announced that the bar within the PCA would not prevent it from using Federal troops to respond to a massive natural disaster such as Katrina. 16 Yet, that resolution somehow was mystifyingly forgotten after Katrina hit. Federal lawyers pondered for days after landfall whether there were exceptions to the PCA that would allow introduction of Federal troops. 17 On This lawlessness contributed to the sub-human conditions experienced at the New Orleans Superdome and Convention Center. The following include some descriptions of the havoc within these structures in which refugees were forced to seek shelter during Katrina: "horrible prison;" "the darkest hole in the world;" "the place I want to forget;" and "hell." 47 The
Superdome had been designated by New Orleans as a shelter of last resort, never meant to hold storm refugees for long. 48 Nonetheless, it housed about 20,000 people between August 29 and September 4, 2005. 49 Even having designated the Superdome as a shelter of last resort, neither the State nor the city had plans to stock the facility with food and water. 50 Lost power meant no air conditioning and backed up toilets. 51 The stench was so bad that medical workers wore masks, and thousands of retching people had to be moved outside the dome.
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One advantage that refugees at the Superdome enjoyed, however, was that those entering that facility had been searched for weapons. 53 Such precautions were not taken at the Ernest N.
Morial Convention Center. 54 Consequently, violence at the Convention Center exceeded even that at the Superdome. 55 The Convention Center was never intended to hold refugees, even as a last resort. 56 Yet, this structure held 15,000 people during those fateful days. 57 Also without power and swelteringly hot, the situation at the Center was described by Captain Winn, the head of the police SWAT team, as "completely lawless." 58 Gunfire was routine. 59 There were several reports of women being dragged off by groups of men and gang-raped. 60 Captain Winn found a corpse with multiple stab wounds in the building. 61 The beleaguered eighty to ninety New
Orleans police officers, already at a severe disadvantage of numbers, could only rush into the darkness with flashlights after seeing muzzle flashes. 62 Even when culprits were caught, no temporary holding cells had been set up to hold them. Army forces east and west of the Mississippi River, respectively), and the supporting commands of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. 65 On August 30, the day after Katrina made landfall, the Deputy Secretary of Defense informed NORTHCOM's Commander that he had a "blank check" for DOD resources he believed were necessary for the response effort.
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The evening of Monday, August 29, the day of Katrina's landfall in Louisiana, Governor
Blanco made her now infamous plea for President Bush to send "everything you have got."
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Over the next two days, Governor Blanco specified her request by asking for troops from the 58 Lipton, supra note 49. 59 Id. 73 Governor Blanco balked at the suggestion, concerned that it was tantamount to a Federal declaration of martial law. 74 The Bush administration then sent Governor Blanco a proposed legal memorandum asking her to request a Federal takeover, which she rejected. 75 She also rejected a more modest proposal for a hybrid command structure, under which a three-star general who had been sworn into the Louisiana National Guard would command all troopsboth State and federalized National Guard and armed services troops.
These appeasing measures at that stage of crisis were thought to be necessary because the Bush administration then believed that the PCA barred deployment of troops to restore order.
The investigation into the legality of invoking the Insurrection Act, an exception to the PCA that would allow Federal troops to enforce civil law, led to "a flurry of meetings at the Justice Department, the White House and other agencies," 77 and erupted into "a fierce debate." 78 The
White House instructed the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") to resolve the issue. The OLC finally "concluded the federal government had authority to move in even over the objection of local officials." 79
The Posse Comitatus Act
As the discussion above demonstrates, the Posse Comitatus Act ("PCA") has been a jurisprudential force to be reckoned with concerning introduction of Federal troops for the purposes of enforcing law. "[E]xcept in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress," the PCA prohibits using the Federal troops for this purpose. 80 Enacted in 1878, the PCA was a response to the imposition of Federal martial law upon the former Confederate States to maintain civil order. 81 Congress was concerned that this use of the U.S. military caused that institution to become increasingly politicized and to stray from its traditional non-civilian function. 82 However, Congress also clearly recognized that, by virtue of Constitutional authority or statutory authorization, exceptions to the general bar would be required in extraordinary circumstances to preserve law and order. 77 Id. 78 Glasser, supra note 29. 79 See Lipton, supra note 17; see also In the context of this discussion, it is important to understand the distinctions between the active armed forces and the National Guard. Members of the armed forces are in the active military service of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. 83 With the exception of the Coast Guard, members of the armed forces are constrained by the PCA. 84 As
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the U.S. Constitution grants the President control of the operation of the armed forces.
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Members of the National Guard simultaneously are members of their respective State militias and the Army Federal reserve. 86 The National Guard traditionally operates under the control of the State and territorial Governors. 87 In this State capacity, members of the National Guard are not constrained by the PCA and may perform civilian law enforcement functions. 88 However, National Guard personnel may be called into Federal service (or "federalized") by the President. 89 While under Federal status, National Guard members may perform typical disaster relief tasks (such as search and rescue, clearing roads, delivering supplies, and providing medical assistance), but, when federalized, members of the Guard are subject to the PCA, and they may not perform law enforcement functions unless pursuant to a PCA exception. 90 On (1) The President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal service, to--(A) restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United States, the President determines that--(i) domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining public order; and (ii) such violence results in a condition described in paragraph (2); or (B) suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy if such insurrection, violation, combination, or conspiracy results in a condition described in paragraph (2).
(2) A condition described in this paragraph is a condition that--(A) so hinders the execution of the laws of a State or possession, as applicable, and of the United States within that State or possession, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State or possession are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (B) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
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The Constitutional Underpinnings of the Warner Amendment It is not triggered until the President makes a finding, as clearly could have been made in Katrina, that the States are "unable" to respond to the disaster. As has been historically true, even serious natural disasters will normally stay within the control of the States when they 134 One can well imagine that at least a part of the Governors' objection to the Warner Amendment is the horrifying and humiliating prospect of being formally and publicly told by the Federal government to step aside in the midst of a disaster. Despite the mandates of the NRP, the responsible Federal officials not only did not regularly meet collectively during Katrina; they never met. Moreover, they only communicated with Louisiana and New Orleans in a sporadic and haphazard manner. 139 This haphazard management style (which defies the basic principles underlying emergency response to catastrophes) allowed the New Orleans situation to spin out of control quickly, thereby necessitating the President's sudden and dramatic insistence that 138 See generally False Conflict, supra note 1, at 2-3. 139 See Lipton, supra note 17.
Governor Blanco surrender her control. If the spirit of the NRP is followed and if the crisis is managed on a real time basis with continuous communication, only in a worst-case scenario would the Federal government find it necessary to direct and supervise the relief effort officially.
In any event, the Constitution not only authorizes Congress to maintain order during a catastrophe of national significance when the States are incapable of doing so, it requires it. Four
Constitutional provisions provide Congress with this authority and responsibility: the Insurrection, Guarantee, Commerce, and the Necessary and Proper Clauses.
The Insurrection and Guarantee Clauses. Goods and services necessary for survival and safety were brought into the region inconsistently and in a disorganized manner, or not at all. 149 On a nationwide basis, industrial services and manufacturing were cut back or terminated. The price of commodities soared throughout the Nation, most noticeably the price of gasoline.
To the extent the Warner Amendment affords the President the right to unilaterally insert In sum, the force of the Insurrection, Guarantee, Commerce, and Necessary and Proper
Clauses form a sturdy Constitutional foundation to support Presidential action under the Warner Amendment even in the face of State resistance.
The Spending Clause
As we have noted above, 167 to raise the minimum drinking age to twenty-one. 178 The Court sustained the statute as a valid exercise of the spending power by outlining a four-part test for determining a condition's Constitutionality. The condition had to:1) be stated clearly; 2) serve the general welfare; 3) be reasonably related to the purpose for which the Federal funds have been allocated; and 4) not induce the States to violate an independent Constitutional bar. 179 The proposed amendment to the Stafford Act would certainly comply with the first three criteria. The provision could unambiguously condition the receipt of funds upon a Federal takeover of the response in situations where the President determined that the State was overwhelmed and unable to make effective use of the Federal resources; the condition would not only serve the general welfare, but would be created solely for that purpose; and the condition would clearly relate to the purpose for which the Federal funds were allocated: effective disaster response designed to save lives and property, and reduce human suffering.
The fourth condition is slightly more complicated in that the Tenth Amendment could present a limitation on Congressional interference with State affairs. 180 As mentioned earlier, all establishing radioactive waste disposal sites, 185 the Federal government is merely giving the State the option to accept Federal assistance contingent upon Federal control of the response during a catastrophe so large that traditional State and local disaster management mechanisms are rendered useless.
The Stafford Act is a critical part of Federal emergency management, and amending it in this way would clarify the Federal infrastructure for disaster response and mitigate damage and human suffering by allowing a Federal takeover of the response in a situation as dire as the one presented during the Gulf Coast hurricanes.
Conclusion
The 186 See supra note120 and accompanying text.
